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Abstract
This paper estimates the e¤ect of judicial institutions on governance and corruption
in local governments. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature
of state judiciary branches in Brazil which assigns prosecutors and judges to the
most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result
of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations,
some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute
counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, o¤enses
per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state
judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of
nancial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems
in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ine¤ective
civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local
residents.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus among both academics and policy-makers that institu-
tions matter for economic development. However, open and contentious questions remain
regarding both econometric identication of the causal link between institutions and de-
velopment and the mechanisms through which this link operates1. In part, the existing
debates are inherent to the nature of cross-country comparisons, which necessarily rely
on highly aggregated measures of institutions and in which identication is notoriously
di¢ cult2. This paper contributes to a recent strand of the literature by providing ev-
idence from more disaggregated units of analysis (municipalities within Brazil) and by
using detailed knowledge about the institutional design of Brazils state judiciary systems
to measure and identify the e¤ect of state judicial presence (our institutional measure)
on local governance (our development outcome)3.
Our paper studies a within-country counterpart of the macro literature on institutions
that examines the role of the judiciary in providing a check on executive and legislative
power. This literature nds that the extent of judicial independence is an important
determinant of political and economic freedom [La Porta et al., 2004], and the quality
of state courts [Berkowitz and Clay, 2006], while the evidence on economic growth is
mixed [Glaeser et al., 2004, Feld and Voigt, 2003]. In the case of local governments in
Brazil, the extent of judicial independence is constitutionally guaranteed because it is
state prosecutors and judges who provide the checks on local executive and legislative
o¢ cials. Rather than evaluating formal independence of the judiciary as in the macro
literature, our contribution is to highlight the e¤ect of local presence of state judicial
1For the view that institutions cause growth see the work of Knack and Keefer [1995], Mauro [1995],
Hall and Jones [1999], Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [2001, 2002, 2004] among others. This wave of
research pointing to the primacy of institutions and governance in the development process has recently
been challenged mostly on empirical grounds. For the alternative view that economic growth causes
institutional improvement see Barro [1999], Alvarez et al., [2000], Djankov et al. [2003] Glaeser et al.
[2004] and Glaeser and Saks [2006].
2See Pande and Udry [2006] for a thorough review of the institutions and growth literature and a call
for research on institutions based on micro data.
3Governance is good when corruption and other arbitrary government interventions are kept low and
public services are delivered e¢ ciently [IPD, forthcoming]. See Rose-Ackermann [1999, 2004] for a review
of the empirical literature on governance and development. See Aidt [2003], Jain [2001] and Bowles [1999]
for a review of the theoretical literature. See Glaeser and Goldin [2004] for an overview of corruption and
reform in US history.
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institutions (local judicial presence for short) on governance and corruption4.
We address potential endogeneity of local judicial presence by exploiting a unique in-
stitutional feature of state judiciary systems in Brazil: although state judiciary branches
provide services to all counties in the state, only the most populous among contiguous
counties in a given judiciary district (comarca in Portuguese) have a local presence of
state prosecutors and judges5. Because the judiciary district-specic relative population
rank determines treatment assignment, there are counties with nearly identical popula-
tions, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute
counterfactual outcomes6. Given that the territorial organization in terms of judiciary
districts is distinct from the territorial organization of local and state governments, we
consider it unlikely that confounding factors such as other public services like govern-
ment banks or tax authorities systematically locate in counties with judicial presence.
The quasi-random assignment of local judicial presence is reected in the fact that after
matching on population, counties with and without local judicial presence are remarkably
similar in observable characteristics, including those that are potentially correlated with
local governance, such as average education of the local population [Glaeser and Saks
2006], and ease of access to information [Svensson 2005a, Ferraz and Finan, 2005a].
Theoretically, the e¤ect of judicial presence on agentsbehavior may work through a
multitude of channels and the net e¤ect is a priori ambiguous7. Executive and legislative
o¢ cials might be exposed to a higher probability of detection in counties with local judicial
presence compared to counties without such presence, because the general public faces
lower transaction costs to report irregularities. Similarly, local o¢ cials may perceive a
4Governance is good when corruption and other arbitrary government interventions are kept low and
public services are delivered e¢ ciently [IPD, forthcoming]. See Rose-Ackermann [1999, 2004] for a review
of the empirical literature on governance and development. See Aidt [2003], Jain [2001] and Bowles [1999]
for a review of the theoretical literature. See Glaeser and Goldin [2004] for an overview of corruption and
reform in US history.
5For simplicity we usually refer to "local judicial presence" rather than "local presence of prosecutors
and judges" although in Brazil the procuracy is in e¤ect a 4th branch of government with strong factual
independence from the other branches.
6See Andrabi et al. [2006] for a similar approach used to identify the e¤ect of establishing government
girlsschools on subsequent supply of education.
7We follow the economic approach to crime formalized by Becker [1968], according to which a person
commits an o¤ense if and only if the expected utility from the o¤ense exceeds utility under the persons
best alternative. The expected utility from committing an o¤ense depends on the magnitude of sanctions
and the probability of their application.
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higher probability of punishment when the state prosecutor lives in town because he faces
lower transaction costs for his investigations. Because transaction costs cut both ways,
however, an alternative mechanism is that local elites might nd it easier to capture state
judiciary o¢ cials when they reside in the same county, which would presumably lower the
probability of punishment and increase the incidence of infractions8.
The outcome measure we use consists of violations of public management regulations
revealed by federal government random audits of transfers to local governments. The
intuition for this measure is that the extent of local management deviations from a ho-
mogeneous national standard reects an aspect of local government ine¢ ciency, assuming
that compliance with the standard is socially benecial. We think that for the vast ma-
jority of the regulations considered by auditors in Brazil this assumption holds, not least
because many of these standards reect international best practices in public nancial
management [PEFA 2006].
Following the terminology of the federal internal audit agency (Controladoria-Geral da
Uniao, CGU) we refer to these violations or o¤enses as irregularities in public management.
The types and incidence of irregularities are representative of problems in the local public
sector in Brazil because counties are randomly selected for federal audits through a public
lottery. The o¤enses reported by auditors range from improper nancial reporting to lack
of oversight in project implementation to waste and actual theft of public resources. From
the auditorsreports we obtain an o¤ense rate at the county level by scaling the incidence
of irregularities by the number of civil servants in the county administration. Because the
reported violations include both corrupt and simply wasteful practices we interpret the
o¤ense rate as a measure of local governance, a higher rate indicating worse governance.
Our paper renes existing governance measures based on audit ndings by using the full
audit reports rather than summaries9 and by deating the number of irregularities by
amounts audited to control for monitoring intensity. We elaborate on our measure and
8See Bardhan and Mookherjee [2000] for the trade-o¤ between local information and capture under
centralized vs. decentralized delivery of public services. See Stigler [1971] on state capture by interest
groups. See Rios-Figuero [2007] for an argument linking judiciary e¤ectiveness to political fragmentation.
9Ferraz and Finan [2005a, 2005b].
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its interpretation below.
Our results indicate that local judicial presence matters. In particular, we nd that
conditional on observable county characteristics, the overall incidence of o¤enses is 35%
lower in counties that have a local presence of state judicial institutions. The lower
incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of nancial management reg-
ulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and
project management, fewer cases of non-existent or ine¤ective civil society oversight and
fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents.
In addition to contributing to the literature on the role of institutions in development,
our paper also complements recent work examining the role of social and political ac-
countability mechanisms in promoting good governance10. In concurrent work, Ferraz
and Finan [2005a] show that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and -
nal term, there is signicantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where
mayors are in their rst term. They also nd that the presence of a judge and local radio
stations reduces this corruption di¤erential, i.e. second-term mayors in counties with ju-
dicial presence are less corrupt than those in counties without such presence and similarly
for the presence of radio stations. In contrast, we nd little evidence that mayoral incum-
bency status matters for local governance11. Our ndings strongly suggest, however, that
local judicial presence reduces irregularities in public management irrespective of whether
the mayor faces a binding term limit or not. Our results also suggest that the presence
of radio stations reduces certain categories of irregularities in public management such
as those related to project execution and project management as well as county nancial
management.
10Our ndings are also consistent with results in recent papers on deterrence. See Corman and Mocan
[2000] for an approach using high frequency time series data. See Levitt [2002] for an approach using the
number of reghters as an instrument for the number of police o¢ cers. See Di Tella and Schargrodsky
[2004] for an approach using geographical allocation of police forces. See Marvell and Moody [1996] and
Eck and Maguire [2000] for surveys of earlier empirical work on police presence and crime.
11The main di¤erence between Ferraz and Finans work and ours is that they use publicly available
summaries of the audit reports while we use the full reports. They also attempt to distinguish corruption
from mismanagement and show results broken down in this way while we focus on the total incidence of
irregularities in public management as well as the incidence in successive stages of public service delivery
(procurement, project execution, nancial reporting, civil society oversight, etc.). As a result of these
di¤erences, the ndings, though not directly comparable, are complementary.
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Other related papers in the empirical anti-corruption literature investigate the e¤ective-
ness of access to information and political and social accountability mechanisms. Olken
[2007] conducts a eld experiment in Indonesia and nds that an increased probability of
government audit reduces corruption by 8 percentage points of total project expenditures
on road construction. Di Tella and Schargrodski [2003] nd that prices paid by public
hospitals of the city of Buenos Aires for basic, homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent
during the rst 9 months of a crackdown on corruption. Reinikka and Svensson [2005a]
show that head teachers in schools closer to a newspaper outlet are more knowledgeable of
the rules governing the education grant program and that these schools managed to claim
a signicantly larger part of their entitlement after a newspaper information campaign
had been initiated by the central government. Ferraz and Finan [2005b] nd that the
disclosure of federal government audit results about local governments has a signicant
impact on the reelection probability of mayors that were found to be corrupt.
A common feature of this recent literature is that the anti-corruption mechanism under
consideration works through political and social accountability of public o¢ cials rather
than through judicial enforcement [Reinikka and Svensson 2005a]. The focus of our paper
is instead on judicial accountability of both public o¢ cials and politicians12. Our approach
complements this existing literature in that it sheds light on the e¤ectiveness of the
prosecution stage of law enforcement13. Examining the enforcement stage is important
because auditors typically have no formal sanctioning power14. Political players may
be sensitive to the mere disclosure of corruption because they can be held accountable
through political and social mechanisms. Whether a public manager is held accountable
depends on whether his case is investigated and whether a judge nds him guilty. While
social sanctions may also play a role in holding public managers accountable, the relative
importance of judicial enforcement is likely to be higher for public o¢ cials compared
12As noted above, Ferraz and Finan [2005a] nd that judiciary presence matters in interaction with
incumbency status but they do not attempt to identify its causal impact.
13See Van Aaken, Salzberger and Voigt [2004] and Rios-Figueroa [2006] for a conceptual overview of
the procuracys relationship with the other powers of government.
14The CGU can open an administrative procedure against federal civil servants. But it is state and
federal prosecutors who have the power to initiate civil or penal procedures against local government
o¢ cials.
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to politicians. More generally, assessing the costs and benets of judicial enforcement
relative to political and social accountability may allow for a more e¤ective approach to
promoting good governance.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the audits program and
institutional setting in more detail. We then present the data on irregularities in local
public management revealed by the audits program in section 3. We discuss our estimation
approach in section 4 and present results in section 5. We conclude with a discussion of
extensions.
2 Audits program and institutional setting
Our measure of governance at the local level is based on audit reports stemming from
a policy of randomly selecting Brazilian municipalities for an audit of federal transfers,
which we refer to as the random audit program. The program was initiated under the
government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in March 2003 with the explicit objective of
ghting corruption. Audits are carried out approximately every 2 months. In each round,
counties are sampled for a federal audit through a public lottery. The machinery used for
the selection of counties is the same as that used for a popular national (money) lottery.
As of July 2007, 24 rounds have been carried out with 60 counties sampled in recent
rounds. Sampling is geographically stratied by state. Larger states tended to have lower
sampling probabilities in the beginning of the program but probabilities have converged to
around 1% in recent rounds. Eligibility is based on a county population threshold, which
was successively raised from 20,000 to 500,000. Today, essentially all counties are eligible
except for state capitals. There is little doubt that county sampling is random. Table I
gives a comparison of average county characteristics for audited and non-audited counties
and conrms that these are balanced. The table also shows that audits are balanced
across mayorspolitical a¢ liations.
The random audits program is implemented by the general comptrollers o¢ ce (CGU),
the internal audit institution of the federal government. When a county is selected, the
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CGU headquarter in Brasilia determines the specic aspects of programs and projects
that are audited and issues detailed inspection orders to state CGU branches. Teams
of auditors that are based in the state o¢ ces of the CGU are then sent to the sampled
county. Transfers eligible for audit include those that are earmarked to carry out national
health and education policies (legais), direct transfers to citizens (diretas) as well as
other negotiated transfers (voluntarias). Inspections occur for a subset of eligible federal
transfers made during the preceding 2 years15.
The number of auditors dispatched depends on county size (area and population), the
proportion of rural and urban areas and the number of items to be audited. For instance,
a county with a small population and a low number of items to be checked, but with a
large rural area may require more auditors than another county with larger population
but more people living in urban areas. In addition, municipalities for which the CGU has
received a lot of complaints or where the mayor was recently impeached, receive larger
teams.
Within a week of the county sampling, auditors spend about 2 weeks in the county in
order to carry out an inspection of nancial reporting and of project execution in the eld.
The quality of public services is assessed through interviews with the local population and
service sta¤ members. Auditors then write a report which details all the irregularities
encountered during their mission. Reports include the amounts of resources audited,
and if possible, any fraction that was diverted, wasted or stolen. This fraction is just a
preliminary estimate, however. The exact amount diverted can only be assessed through
a more detailed inspection which occurs only if it is subsequently deemed appropriate by
local prosecutors. County mayors are given the possibility to comment on the draft report
within 5 business days. Auditors in turn explain whether or not they accept the mayors
justication of problems found.
Final reports are sent to local legislatures, the federal ministries which are remitting
the transfers, external audit institutions at state and federal levels, as well as state and
federal prosecutors. Prosecutors then decide whether to further investigate the irregular-
15Exceptions to this rule are possible if warranted by the program under inspection.
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ities uncovered by auditors and whether to press charges against particular individuals.
If convicted of corruption, defendants may be imprisoned for 1 to 8 years, in addition to
losing their mandate and incurring nes16. Because the judiciary cannot initiate proceed-
ings on its own, prosecutors play a key role in the criminal justice system17. In Brazil,
prosecutors and judges are not part of local governments but of the state government and
they are granted substantial de iure and de facto independence. The 1988 Constitution
stipulates that individual prosecutors cannot be red and guarantees their salaries. Pros-
ecutors are hired by public examination which are highly competitive. At the state level,
the only formal political inuence occurs through the appointment of the attorney-general
by the state governor from a short-list of three candidates who are members of the state
procuracy.
Having described some key features of the Brazilian control system, we now present
our measure of local governance in more detail.
3 Data on local governance
The violations reported by auditors range from improper nancial reporting to lack of
oversight in project implementation to waste and actual theft of public resources. (See
Appendix I for our translation of an extract from an audit report). The following quotes,
translated from actual audit reports, illustrate the types of irregularities encountered by
auditors.
In order to circumvent a more formal procedure required for procurement amounts
above the legal threshold, the manager fragmented the purchase of medication
into a series of smaller amounts. We also found that there exists no inventory
control at the healthcare center and that expired medication has been purchased.
We verify the existence of improper payments to administrative sta¤ at the ex-
pense of service personnel in the healthcare center. This situation is contrary to
16See Arantes [2004] on the organization and legal instruments at the disposal of the Brazilian "Minis-
terio Publico".
17Prosecutors do not have the monopoly to charge individuals with corruption or administrative impro-
bity as Art. 5 of the Brazilian constitution gives that right to ordinary citizens as well. Citizens rarely
press charges, however.
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health ministry regulation which explicitly prohibits the use of federal transfers
to this end.
The mayors o¢ ce failed to organize a competitive tender for the procurement
of school textbooks under the pretext that these books were unique although
equivalent alternative textbooks were in fact available. The same administration
had purchased di¤erent textbooks in the past.
Our inspection of the project execution for two sanitary units reveals that they
were constructed in smaller dimensions than projected. We also found that the
height of the ceramic masonry in the bathroom was constructed below project
specications.
Audit report ndings were compiled into a database by a team of researchers directed
by Francisco Ramos at the federal university of Pernambuco. Because of a data processing
lag, our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 561 counties that have been audited
through round 12.
Following the practice of the comptroller generals o¢ ce, we refer to the reported
violations of public sector rules and regulations as irregularities in public administration.
It is worth emphasizing that each reported irregularity constitutes a breach of a specic
legal norm. Although many irregularities would qualify as corrupt practices, in the sense
of indicating abuse of public o¢ ce for private (material) gain, most instances mainly reect
bad public management. Indeed, none of the examples above appear to unambiguously
involve corruption. In all examples, however, managers were not exerting enough e¤ort
on their job, i.e. they were shirking or circumventing regulations that are intended to
benet end-users of public services. They circumvented procurement procedures that are
privately costly to carry out, neglected inventory control, diverted public funds from their
intended use and failed to oversee project implementation by contractors.
While these practices for the most part reect ine¢ cient management of public re-
sources they may also open the door for corruption and are thus undesirable on both
accounts. They illustrate that distinguishing corruption from bad management more gen-
erally is very di¢ cult in practice. Indeed, existing objective measures typically capture
corruption together with more general forms of government ine¢ ciency. This problem is
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most pronounced with unit cost measures [Golden and Picci, 2005] and input prices for
hospital supplies [Di Tella and Schargrodski, 2003]. It also seems likely, however, that
at least part of the di¤erence between funds disbursed by the central government and
funds reported by recipients (schools) reects management quality, i.e. adequate book-
keeping, rather than corruption [Reinikka and Svensson, 2004]. Similarly, at least part of
the di¤erence between reported expenditure on road construction and estimated actual
expenditure may be due to project management, i.e. attention to materials lost in the
construction process, rather than corruption [Olken, 2007].
Rather than attempting to disentangle corruption from mismanagement, we focus on
the overall level of violations as well as major categories of irregularities committed in a
given county. We believe that our broader focus on governance rather than corruption
is justied since corruption is only one type of government failure determining overall
government performance [Rose-Ackermann, 2004]. Similarly, distinguishing between ir-
regularities that are committed knowingly and those that occur due to lack of capacity or
ignorance of the appropriate nancial management rules is exceedingly di¢ cult in prac-
tice. Again, however, what matters for government performance is whether regulations
are followed or not, and not so much the exact reasons for (non)compliance.
It is also worth noting that not all problems reported by auditors are under the con-
trol of county o¢ cials. We exclude those instances from our governance measures where
auditors report on state or federal government failures or where reported irregularities
are otherwise beyond local government control. We group irregularities according to
whether they relate to procurement, program/project execution, nancial reporting, pro-
gram/project management, civil society oversight, remittance management, payments or
other. See Appendix II for a more detailed description of these categories and relative
frequencies of irregularities. The examples above reect irregularities in procurement and
program management, program management, procurement and project management re-
spectively. We obtain o¤ense rates by scaling the incidence of a given type of irregularity
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by the number of civil servants in the county administration18. See Table II for summary
statistics of the above categories scaled by the number of civil servants and broken down
by judiciary seat status. We interpret these o¤ense rates as measures of governance in
local governments, a higher rate indicating worse governance.
While scaling by the potential number of o¤enders seems appropriate in general, there is
the possibility that in our particular application we are scaling by an endogenous variable,
which would complicate the interpretation of an estimated e¤ect. Indeed one of the
allegations of corruption and bad management at the local level that is often made is
precisely the hiring of friends and relatives for government jobs. All else equal, this
would result in a lower o¤ense rate which is precisely the opposite of what our governance
measure is supposed to capture. This problem is somewhat mitigated by the fact that
auditors routinely check on civil servantsqualications, which implies that the number of
reported irregularities increases with unqualied nepotistic hiring. In order test whether
scaling by number of civil servants is crucial for our results we also use resident population,
which is presumably exogenous. Using resident population as the denominator for the
governance measure does not qualitatively alter the results in terms of sign and signicance
and so we focus our discussion on o¤enses per civil servant which is more appealing on
theoretical grounds.
Our governance measure is closely related to the "government e¤ectiveness" component
of the World Banks governance indicators [Kaufmann et al. 2003], which is focused on the
"inputs required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies
and deliver public goods." The level of o¤enses committed by civil servants measures
to what extent these inputs are either diverted, wasted or otherwise used suboptimally
from a social point of view. We think that this governance measure is more reliable than
existing measures as it is based on facts rather than perceptions19.
Despite this relative advantage, there are two major caveats worth mentioning. First,
we assume that existing rules and regulations which dene irregularities make sense, i.e.
18Scaling by the number of potential o¤enders is standard practice in the literature on the economics
of crime. See, for example, Rubin, Shepherd and Dezhbakhsh [2003]
19See Kaufmann et al. [2006] for a discussion of current corruption measures.
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they serve a legitimate purpose in a reasonable way20. Put di¤erently, we take irregulari-
ties to be generally detrimental to public service delivery, rather than reecting attempts
by well-meaning o¢ cials to circumvent ine¢ cient red tape. As mentioned above, mayors
and managers have the possibility to comment on the audit report. Sometimes auditors
concede that there are valid arguments for non-compliance and we exclude these instances
from our calculations. Based on our reading of the regulations considered here, we believe
that reported irregularities are for the most part undesirable from a social point of view
because they either involve a direct waste or loss of public resources or complicate the
detection of such mismanagement. It is also worth noting that the regulations pertaining
to public nancial management, such as procurement and nancial management and re-
porting procedures, reect international best practices21. In order to partly address the
worry about ine¢ cient regulations, we break irregularities down into categories related
to di¤erent stages of public service delivery. This allows for a more nuanced view of
irregularities and their desirability from a social point of view.
The second major caveat to our governance measure is that we need to assume that
reported irregularities are a xed proportion of actual irregularities. This assumption
would not hold, for instance, if auditors were themselves corrupt and could be bribed
into manipulating audit ndings [Mookherjee and Png, 1995]. If this manipulation were
for some reason more likely in counties with judicial presence, it would invalidate our
approach. However, we believe that the institutional setup makes it very unlikely that
auditors are corrupt. First, auditors are paid by the federal government, not by local
governments, which makes it less likely that they are captured by local special interests.
Second, auditors work in teams of up to 10 people. This makes it hard to sustain collusion
at any signicant scale because the whole team has to be bribed in order to conceal
irregularities. Third, the interaction between auditors and their "customers" is at a single
point in time, which again makes it harder to sustain collusion.
20Without this assumption we are still evaluating compliance. Evaluating local government e¢ ciency
is arguably more important, however.
21See PEFA [2006] for an overview of international standards in public nancial management.
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It could be argued, however, that even if auditors were incorruptible, the local elite
might somehow manage to manipulate what gets uncovered and what remains unnoticed.
While this scenario is plausible in general, it is unlikely in our case because local elites
play no direct role in carrying out the audit. Auditors go into a county with specic
orders to investigate particular programs and projects and the items on their list are not
subject to local review. Neither is it likely that local managers succeed in systematically
concealing irregular transactions such that auditors fail to uncover them. The audit is
simply too thorough for this to happen as it involves both nancial auditing and detailed
inspection of public works and services.
The main potential reason why reported irregularities would not be a xed proportion
of actual irregularities is if auditors in the eld spent disproportionate amounts of time
and e¤ort in a given county or if the CGU headquarter exercised discretion in the types
of programs and amounts of resources included in the inspection orders issued to state
CGU branches. As mentioned above, we know that the CGU headquarters sometimes
uses discretion in allocating auditing resources to "high-risk" counties. It is thus not
clear whether a higher reported o¤ense rate reects a higher propensity of county o¢ cials
to commit irregularities or whether it simply reects more intensive reporting. Ideally,
we would scale reported irregularities by the number of audit man-hours spent in a given
county in order to identify underlying propensities to commit irregularities. Unfortunately
the audit man-hour data per county is not readily available so we use the amount of Reais
(R$) audited as a proxy measure. The dependent variable in all of the specications below
is therefore the incidence of irregularities per R$ audited per civil servant22. As long as
any remaining potential measurement error is not correlated with local judicial presence,
our estimation approach will yield unbiased estimates of the treatment e¤ect.
Table III gives summary statistics of o¤enses and scaling variables broken down by
counties that were seats of the judiciary in 1999 and those that did not have such judicial
presence. It appears that in counties without judicial presence there are on average 19
22Results are signicant at conventional levels and the sign is quantitatively similar (about -30%) when
we deate irregularities only by the amount audited and qualitatively similar (about -15%) when we
deate by the number of civil servants only. Results are available upon request.
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o¤enses reported per 100 civil servants over a two year period. This is about twice the
rate reported for judiciary seat counties. This result carries through when we scale by
population.
Data on county characteristics are obtained from several sources. Information on
county infrastructure, including the indicator for local judicial presence is taken from two
surveys entitled Perl dos Municípios Brasileiros: Gestão Pública for the years 1999
and 2001, conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geograa e Estatistica (IBGE). Popu-
lation data are also from IBGE. Data on local income distribution, schooling and health
outcomes and distance from state capitals are from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica
Aplicada (IPEA) based on the 2000 census. Political participation data is from the Tri-
bunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). County total revenue is from the Ministerio da Fazenda
(MF). In the following section we discuss our estimation approach in more detail.
4 Estimation approach
We are interested in estimating the causal e¤ect of judicial presence on the quality of
local governance. The empirical challenge is that a correlation between judicial presence
and irregularities does not imply causation because state judiciary o¢ cials might chose
the location of the local judiciary seat at least partly in response to local governance
conditions23. In order to address reverse causality, we exploit a unique feature of the
organization of state judiciary systems in Brazil: prosecutors and judges must reside in the
county which serves as the seat of the judiciary district. The creation of judiciary districts,
which typically encompass several counties, is based on county area, population size,
electorate, county scal revenue and caseload of the judiciary as determined by national
law24. State laws specify necessary conditions for the creation of judiciary districts in
terms of these observable characteristics with the explicit objective of facilitating citizens
access to the judicial system. Although most state laws do not specify which county
23See Eide [1998] for a review of the empirical literature on the economics of crime. See Polinsky and
Shavell [2000] for a review of the economic theory of enforcement of law.
24Lei Complementar No 35, de 14 de Marco de 1979, Art. 95-97.
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should be the seat of the judiciary district, empirically, the judiciary seat is located in
the largest county in terms of population. Because the judiciary district-specic relative
population rank determines treatment assignment, there are counties with nearly identical
populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to
impute counterfactual outcomes.
We illustrate the judiciary seat assignment mechanism for the majority of states in
Brazil in Table IV below25. The table presents probit estimation results explaining loca-
tion of the judiciary seat in 2005 in terms of characteristics that determine the creation of
judiciary districts and an indicator that equals 1 if the county had the maximum popula-
tion in its district in 2005 and 0 otherwise. Table IV shows that the maximum population
indicator is nearly a su¢ cient statistic for location of the judiciary seat. The indicator
by itself explains 99% of judiciary seat locations and other characteristics that determine
judiciary districts have almost no additional explanatory power. We conclude from this
table that assignment to treatment is almost exclusively based on population. Because
we cannot construct the indicator for maximum population for all states in our sample
we present OLS regression results rather than IV results from a non-random subsample.
IV results from the subsample are available on request. IV results are marginally larger
in absolute value, which is not surprising given that the rst stage is very strong.
A potentially more serious threat to validity of our strategy is that unobserved factors
might be correlated with both judiciary seats and the incidence of irregularities. Given
that the territorial organization in terms of judiciary districts is distinct from the terri-
torial organization of local and state governments, however, we consider it unlikely that
potentially confounding factors such as other public services like government banks or tax
authorities systematically locate in counties with local judicial presence. Other factors
have been identied by the recent literature on ghting corruption and we control for
those in our estimations.
25The sample includes all counties from the states of Amapa, Bahia, Amazonas, Ceara, Goias, Minas
Gerais, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Piaui, Parana, Rio Grande do Norte,
Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Roraima. We are in the process of obtaining data on judiciary
districts for the remaining states.
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Control variables include measures of political competition at the local level, such as
the number of political parties and whether the mayor faces a binding term limit [Ferraz
and Finan 2005a] and measures of access to information such as the presence of local
radio stations [Ferraz and Finan 2005a] and proximity of newspaper outlets [Reinikka and
Svensson 2005a, 2005b]. Instead of proximity of newspaper outlets we use the presence of
an internet provider in the county as a proxy measure for ease of access to information. We
proxy for the level of social cohesion or social capital in a community using voter turnout
[Zingales 2004]. The rationale for this measure is that because there are no economic or
local legal incentives to vote, high voter turnout is likely to reect a shared concern for
public a¤airs26. We also include average education of the local population [Glaeser and
Saks 2006] as well as the geometric distance of counties from their respective state capitals
because external control agencies such as the CGU or state courts of account are based
in state capitals. Finally, we include a set of other control variables as listed in Table V
below.
We use a semi-log specication in order to facilitate interpretation of the coe¢ cient
associated with judicial presence. The full estimation equation including economic and
demographic county characteristics X is as follows:
ln(o¤enses/R$ audited/civil servants)ijt = 1(seat of judiciary district)ijt 1 (1)
+2(distance from state capital)ijt 1
+3(mayor in second term)ijt 1






ijt 1 + aj + cst+ "ijt
26Voting is mandatory in Brazil. While this national requirement may a¤ect the level of voter turnout in
Brazil, variation in local turnout is likely to be driven by concerns for the public good or social pressure,
both of which are commonly associated with social capital. Zingales [2004] uses this measure to study
the e¤ect of social capital on nancial development.
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A nal potential threat to the validity of our results is that the judiciary seat indicator
may be capturing a non-linear relationship between population and o¤enses per civil
servant27. One way to address this issue would be to specify a more exible functional
form for population, using dummy variables for population brackets for example. Results
may then hinge on the specication of the functional form, however. Instead we use the
matching technique to estimate the judiciary seat e¤ect non-parametrically. Essentially
we calculate the average di¤erence in o¤ense rates for counties that are of similar size in
terms of population but either have local judicial presence or not. We check validity of
the results by ensuring that after matching, the two groups are comparable in observable
characteristics.
More formally let Yi = Yi(Wi) denote the outcome of interest, i.e. the incidence of
irregularities per civil servant in county i and let Wi  f0; 1g indicate treatment status,
i.e. whether the county has judicial presence or not28. For a given county either Yi(1) or
Yi(0) are observed but never both. We are interested in the e¤ect of local judicial presence
on the incidence of irregularities in public management:  i = Yi(1)  Yi(0): Since Yi(0) is
not observed, we need to estimate Y^i(0), i.e. we want to estimate what the incidence of
irregularities would have been had the county not had a local judicial presence. Matching
estimators impute the missing potential outcome from average outcomes of counties with
similar characteristics Let Ji = set of indices of units that are close to unit i according
to some metric m, i.e..resident population in our case and let #Ji = number of units in







Letting N1 stand for the number of treated (judiciary seat) units in the sample, the
27 A related problem is that a parametric model as in equation 1 may extrapolate over regions of
non-overlapping covariate support, which may bias treatment e¤ect estimates. See, e.g., Heckman et al.
[1998a].
28The following discussion is based on Heckman et al. 1998b, Dehejia and Wahba [2002] and Abadie
and Imbens [2006].
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average treatment e¤ect for the treated (ATT) is estimated as follows:
^





For the matching estimator to identify and consistently estimate the ATT we need to
assume that assignment to treatment is independent of potential outcomes, conditional
on covariates X; and that the probability of assignment to treatment is bounded away
from 0 and 129:
(1) W is independent of (Y (0); Y (1)) conditional on X = x;
(2) c < P (W = 1jX = x) < 1  c, for some c > 0.
We have shown in Table IV that assignment to treatment in our case is based on
one covariate: county population30. Whether potential outcomes are independent of
assignment to treatment depends on the existence of omitted variables that are correlated
with local judicial presence and also a¤ect governance. For the probability of assignment
to treatment to be bounded away from 0 and 1 for a given pattern of covariates, there
needs to be su¢ cient overlap in covariate support across treatment and comparison groups.
Because the largest counties tend to be assigned to treatment there is a region of the
covariate support for small counties for which assumption (2) is violated: P (W = 1jX =
x) = 0. This implies that it is hard to estimate the average treatment e¤ect for the control
units (ATC) as there are only few treated units that could serve to estimate counterfactual
outcomes. It is for this reason that we focus on the ATT. We show below that for the
treated units reasonably similar comparison units do exist31.
5 Estimation results
Table VI gives estimation results for the total number of reported o¤enses per civil servant
per R$ audited and an expanding set of controls for county economic and demographic
characteristics listed in Table V. We are mostly interested in the sign, magnitude and
29For details on the regularity conditions see Abadie and Imbens [2006].
30See Rubin [1977] for a discussion of this assignment mechanism.
31See Heckman et al. [1998a] for a discussion of this point.
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statistical signicance of the estimated parameter b, the coe¢ cient on the judiciary seat
dummy. The rst row in Table VI shows that the size of this coe¢ cient shrinks in
absolute terms from about - 186% to about - 40% as more economic and demographic
control variables are added. Larger counties in terms of population tend to have fewer
irregularities per civil servant and since judiciary seat counties tend to be larger than
non-seat counties, controlling linearly for population in column 2 substantially reduces
the estimated coe¢ cient. State and party a¢ liation e¤ects introduced in column 3 do not
appear to alter the point estimate of 1 much. The introduction of county economic and
demographic control variables in column 4 further reduces the e¤ect of judicial presence
on governance, although the e¤ect remains highly statistically signicant. Finally, the
statistical signicance of some of the square terms reported in column V points to the
importance of appropriate specication of the functional form. The main result from Table
VI is that the main coe¢ cient of interest, b1, is negative and statistically signicant
throughout. Taking column 6 in Table VI as the benchmark specication, the point
estimate suggests that judicial presence reduces irregularities per civil servant by about
40% on average32.
Table VII shows that this result is very robust to the introduction of control variables
more directly related to governance. In Column 1 we add the distance from state capitals
which proxies for the extent of external top-down control over local governments. The
point estimate of 1 is almost unchanged and the coe¢ cient on distance from capital
is positive throughout although statistically insignicant. The sign of the coe¢ cient is
consistent with our argument about transaction costs reducing the probability of prose-
cution and detection for counties that are further away from enforcement agencies such as
the CGU or state courts of account. Measures of political competition are introduced in
columns 2 and 3 but these do not seem to be correlated with the location of the judiciary
seat, resulting in unchanged point estimates of 1 :While the number of political parties
appears to be positively correlated with irregularities in local public management, the
32Because the number of counties selected for federal audit varies by state and over time we also weigh
observations by the inverse of their sampling probability. Results are quantitatively very similar to those
obtained with unweighted observations.
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mayors incumbency status does not seem to matter much. The indicator for existence of
radio stations (column 4) and access to internet (column 5) have some predictive power
as does our measure of social capital (column 6). None of these are correlated with ju-
diciary seat location, however, resulting in unchanged point estimates of 1: Using the
most conservative estimate, we nd that the incidence of o¤enses is about 39% lower in
counties with judicial presence. While we cannot rule out the possibility that unobserved
omitted variables are driving our results we consider it unlikely, given our extended set
of controls and the underlying quasi-random assignment of judiciary seats conditional on
population.
In Table VIII we show estimation results broken down by o¤ense category. For most
categories there is a signicant number of counties for which no o¤enses were reported.
In order to account for this corner solution outcome at 0 we estimate Tobit models for
the various categories of irregularities and only report OLS estimates when results are
qualitatively the same as Tobit results. Breaking down the overall e¤ect of judicial pres-
ence by o¤ense category is useful as it facilitates and sharpens the interpretation of our
results. Table VIII shows that the overall reduction in o¤enses per civil servant induced
by judicial presence stems mostly from fewer instances of problems in project execution
and project management, fewer violations of nancial reporting and management regula-
tions, fewer cases of non-existent or ine¤ective civil society oversight and fewer cases of
improper handling of remittances to local residents. Our results thus suggest that judicial
presence plays an important role in promoting selected aspects of good governance at the
local level. Results also show that the distance from state capitals is mostly associated
with more problems in local procurement. Access to information appears to reduce prob-
lems in local governance related to project execution and management as well as nancial
management. Finally, there is some evidence that there are more irregularities in project
management in counties where the mayor is in his second and nal term.
In order to address concerns about functional form specication, Table IX shows es-
timation results from matching on county population. Only treated units that have a
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"close" (within 1000) match in terms of population are considered. At -36.8%, the es-
timated ATT is very close to the -39% estimate obtained in the full sample above and
statistically signicant. Table IX also reports sample averages for treatment and com-
parison group characteristics after single nearest-neighbor matching33. Panel B shows
that relative to the full sample, the comparison group is on average much closer to the
treatment group after matching on population. After matching, the two groups are also
quite similar in absolute terms although there are some exceptions. Counties with judicial
presence are more likely to have local radio stations, their voter turnout is slightly higher,
they have smaller budgets, lower poverty gaps and higher gini coe¢ cients34.
Ideally, none of these di¤erences should be statistically signicant. The fact that they
are raises the possibility that the estimated ATT is biased. Rather than judicial presence,
di¤erences in access to information, for example, may account for the observed average
di¤erence in irregularities per civil servant.
We attempt to remove some of the potential bias associated with these imbalances
by estimating equation 1 for the matched sample, i.e. excluding those comparison group
observations that were not used as matches for any treated unit. The estimate of 1
reported in the second column of Table IX Panel A is very close to the estimate obtained
in the full sample, suggesting that covariate imbalance is not fundamentally biasing the
results. As a second robustness check we attempt to balance covariates across treatment
and comparison groups more precisely by forcing a closer match between treated and
comparison units35.
Table X shows estimation results from matching on county population where only
treated units that have a "neighbor" within 50 people are retained in the estimation sam-
ple. Panel B shows that closer matching eliminates the imbalance in sample means for all
covariates except urbanization and the poverty gap measure, none of which are signicant
33Estimated ATTs are robust to higher number of matches but covariate balance is slightly worse due
to the inclusion of more distant matches. Results are available upon request.
34Although we do not try to match counties within state borders, a visual inspection of the geographical
location of comparison counties suggests that they are not clustered in a given region, which reduces the
potential for bias due to regional variation in the quality of governance.
35Matching on the propensity score yields quantitatively similar results. See Heckman et al. [1998b]
and Dehejia and Wahba [2002] for details of the propensity score matching procedure.
22
predictors of irregularities (Table VI). The estimated ATT is -35% and signicant. The
estimate of 1 from the matched sample is -37%, which is again close to earlier results.
Alternative specications of the required closeness of each match yield quantitatively sim-
ilar results. We conclude from this exercise that the observed reduction in irregularities
for counties with judicial presence is very robust to specications of functional from.
6 Conclusion
Our results support the hypothesis that judicial presence promotes good governance at
the local level. We nd that the incidence of o¤enses is about 35% lower in counties that
serve as local seat of the judiciary branch. Showing the e¤ectiveness of law enforcement
in deterring public sector o¤enses is our main contribution to the empirical literature on
ways to improve governance. Given the random sampling process, the result is likely to
generalize to all counties with judicial presence in Brazil, not just those in our estimation
sample. Although we were unable to estimate the e¤ect of judicial presence for counties
without such presence directly, it seems likely that scaling up judicial presence at the local
level would reduce irregularities in public management.
Whether scaling up is advisable depends on the net benets of such a policy. While
the costs of an expansion of judicial presence to all local governments are relatively easy
to quantify, assessing the benets in monetary terms is di¢ cult as we would need to
know the value of a marginal increase in compliance with existing public sector rules
and regulations. A rst step in this direction would be to quantify the cost savings and
service delivery improvements stemming from judicial presence. As noted earlier, audit
reports sometimes include an estimated amount of funds that were diverted, wasted or
stolen. Because this amount is a preliminary estimate and not systematically reported
by auditors it was not included in our database. By going back to the underlying audit
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8 Appendix I
National program for agricultural development
Activity: nancial assistance for municipal infrastructure and public service projects.
Objective: nancial support to municipal governments with a view to implement,
modernize, amplify, rationalize and reallocate infrastructure related to small scale agri-
cultural development.
Inspection orders: 149529 and 149532
Objects inspected: Rural electrication, sewage and transportation systems
Local executing agent: government executive branch
Type of transfer: Contract, n.o 105034-13.
Financial resources transferred: R$ 163.127,92
Scope of inspection: Total amount
3.1) Irregularity in procurement related to the electrication project
Fact:
Out of three rms that participated in the tendering, two of them were represented by
the same engineer who also wrote the project specications. This is contrary to art. 9,
of law n.o 8.666/93 which prohibits the participation of the author of the project in the
tendering- and reduces e¤ective competition, which is contrary to § 1.o, art. 3.o, of the
same law.
Evidence: Analysis of related procurement documentation.




Procurement (15.2% of 28727 irregularities in total)
Irregularities in this category relate mostly to limited competition for contracts and
attempts to obstruct oversight by both auditors and stakeholders in the procurement
process. The following are the types of irregularities included in this category: absence of
preliminary price survey (7.7% of procurement related irregularities), missing/incomplete
procurement documentation (23%), irregular composition/capture of the procurement
commission (10.2%), invitation for bids to less than three rms (9.1%), fractionalizing
of procurement amounts (4.5%), non-selection of the lowest bid among those that meet
project requirements (2.8%), evidence of price collusion (1%), inappropriate procurement
modality (less competition) (11.2%), inadequate/incomplete publication of tender infor-
mation (14%), participating ineligible rm (11.7%), other (4.6%)
Program/project execution (27.3%)
This category includes irregularities related to the execution of new programs and cap-
ital projects. Irregularities include the following: diversion of project resources (10.8%),
partial project execution (11.2%), substandard project execution (9.1%), project not exe-
cuted (9.6%), lacking oversight of project implementation (13.6%), irregular project docu-
mentation (14%), inadequate project inputs (3%), time overruns (3.4%), other (4%). Also
included in this category are instances where program execution is impaired by a lack of
infrastructure (8.1%), matching grant requirements are not met by local governments
(5.8%), or sta¤ members have inadequate training (7.2%)
Financial reporting (14.5%)
This category includes irregularities related to the quality and timeliness of nancial
reporting by local governments. Public o¢ cials involved in committing irregularities are
for the most part nancial managers. Irregularities include the following: irregular/non-
existent nancial report (64.6%), irregular/non-existent receipts (27.9%), untimely re-
porting (5.9%), other (1.5%)
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Program/project management (9.9%)
Irregularities in this category are related to management of existing public capital
projects and services. Irregularities are as follows: irregular sale of equipment (2.5%), non-
existent equipment utilization control (13.6%), non-existent inventory control (24.2%),
inadequate equipment/inventory maintenance (24.7%), completed but unused projects
(13.8%), inappropriate use of equipment (16.5%), non-existent project/service (3.7%),
other (1%)
County nancial management (4.1%)
Irregularities in this category are related to county nancial management. Irregularities
are as follows: excess cash holdings (opportunity cost) (8.5%), emission of checks without
justication (37.8), irregular account management (36.7), spending without appropriation
(10.7%) and other (6.2%)
Civil society oversight (6%)
Irregularities in this category are related to civil society oversight. Irregularities are
as follows: non-existent civil society council (13.5%), ine¢ cient/non-existent oversight
(76.2%), irregular council composition (1.7%), evidence of council capture by mayor
(6.4%), other (2.3%)
Remittance management (11.5%)
Irregularities in this category are related to management of remittances to individuals.
Irregularities are as follows: remittance to ineligible individuals (16.9%)), partial or non
remittance (19.8%), non-existent school attendance verication (12%),.number of bene-
ciaries below target (6.8%), incomplete register of beneciaries (15%), delayed remittances
(3.8%), duplication of remittance (2.2%), other (23.6%)
Irregular payments (3.2%)
Irregularities in this category are related to unjustied/undocumented or excessive
payments for goods and services.
Other irregularities (8.3%)
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(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Resident population ('000) 29.2 31.4
(3.0) (2.8)
County total revenue ('000'000) 17.9 24.0
(1.9) (3.1)
Average years of schooling (years) 3.9 4.0
(people 25 and older) (0.05) (0.02)
Civil servants (#) 658.0 683.0
(36.8) (35.1)
Income per capita (R$) 119.7 123.2
(3.0) (1.0)
Poverty  (%) 26.1 24.7
(National poverty line R$ 37.75/month) (0.8) (0.3)
Life expectancy (years) 67.4 67.7
(0.2) (0.1)
Infant mortality (%) 46.2 44.5
(1.2) (0.4)
Sample size 550 4956
Note: all data for year 2000
Panel B: Party affiliations of mayors in Brazil and in audited counties
Mayor’s Party Brazil        % Audited
counties
%
PMDB 1254 22.69 127 22.64
PFL 1025 18.55 102 18.18
PSDB 988 17.88 105 18.72
PP (Ex-PPB) 617 11.16 60 10.7
PTB 397 7.18 29 5.16
PDT 287 5.19 33 5.88
PL 233 4.22 25 4.46
PT 174 3.15 17 3.03
PPS 163 2.95 16 2.85
PSB 131 2.37 16 2.85
Note: only largest parties listed in this table
33






Procurement N 0.027 0.039 0 0.413
Y 0.016 0.020 0 0.155
Program/project execution N 0.052 0.042 0 0.231
Y 0.027 0.023 0 0.132
Financial reporting N 0.030 0.030 0 0.217
Y 0.014 0.015 0 0.132
Program/project management N 0.020 0.021 0 0.188
Y 0.009 0.009 0 0.061
Financial management N 0.008 0.012 0 0.070
Y 0.004 0.005 0 0.045
Civil society oversight N 0.015 0.013 0 0.073
Y 0.006 0.006 0 0.036
Remittance management N 0.025 0.023 0 0.122
Y 0.011 0.011 0 0.059
Irregular payments N 0.007 0.009 0 0.055
Y 0.003 0.004 0 0.033
Irregular service charge N 0.001 0.003 0 0.018
Y 0.001 0.002 0 0.016
Other N 0.011 0.016 0 0.098
Y 0.008 0.012 0 0.083
Note: 299 out of 550 counties in our estimation sample serve as seat of the judiciary district.
All categories scaled by the number of civil servants in the county administration.
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Number of offenses N 44 25 2 174
Y 56 32 1 244
Number of civil servants N 317 248 55 1801
Y 976 1120 118 11696
Amount audited (‘000) N 2473 3545 129 38200
Y 10200 35000 311 584000
Offenses per R$ 1m audited N 30.15 23.74 1.82 149
Y 15.53 20.52 0.07 280
Offenses per R$ 1m audited N 0.165 0.217 0.003 1.87
per civil servant Y 0.036 0.073 0.00 1.00
Offenses per civil servant N 0.190 0.140 0.008 0.817
Y 0.095 0.075 0.001 0.615
County population ('000) N 10.03 11.78 1.27 142.38
Y 37.34 49.07 3.56 449.48
Offenses per county resident N 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.033
Y 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.025
Civil servants per capita N 0.038 0.016 0.006 0.112
Y 0.030 0.012 0.007 0.089
N 0.33 0.32 0.00 1.00Civil servants without entry
examination (%) Y 0.40 0.34 0.00 1.00
Note: 299 out of 550 counties in our estimation sample serve as seat of the judiciary district.
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Table IV: determinants of judiciary seat location
Dependent Variable:
Judiciary seat
Max population 0.95 0.95 0.85 0.85 0.85
(0.005)** (0.005)** (0.028)** (0.028)** (0.031)**
Area (‘000) 17.75 11.82 14.2 17.85
(7.24)* (6.67) (6.39)* (7.46)*
Population ('000) 0.01 -0.011 -0.018
(0.001)** (0.011) (0.011)*


















       Notes: Table gives marginal effects after probit estimations. Dependent variable equals 1 if
       county was the local judiciary seat in 2005 and 0 otherwise. Max population equals 1 if the
       county had the largest population in its district in 2005 and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in
parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Variable Judiciary Seat Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Distance from state capital (km) N 264 162 17 736
Y 216 158 12 821
Mayor’s second term (0/1) N 0.43 0.50 0 1
Y 0.40 0.49 0 1
Political parties (#) N 2.50 0.86 1 7
Y 3.00 1.05 1 7
Radio station (0/1) N 0.28 0.45 0 1
Y 0.68 0.47 0 1
Internet access (0/1) N 0.08 0.28 0 1
Y 0.40 0.49 0 1
Voter turnout (%) N 0.87 0.06 0.62 0.99
Y 0.85 0.06 0.58 0.97
Resident population ('000) N 10.0 11.8 12.7 142.4
Y 37.3 49.1 3.6 449.5
Electorate ('000) N 6.5 6.5 1.2 74.7
Y 23.8 30.8 2.5 313.2
Total county revenue ('000) N 5627 10800 3 137000
Y 16200 27200 1629 273000
Income per capita N 147 80 41 440
Y 174 99 42 834
Average years of schooling N 3.68 1.15 0.81 7.59
(people 25 and older) Y 4.21 1.29 1.44 8.75
Life expectancy N 66.99 4.86 55.91 77
Y 67.55 4.07 55.91 78
Urban population (%) N 0.53 0.24 0.12 1
Y 0.65 0.21 0.15 1
Poverty (%) N 0.28 0.18 0.01 0.71
(National poverty line R$ 37.75/month) Y 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.75
Poverty gap (%) N 0.51 0.10 0.25 0.78
Y 0.51 0.09 0.20 0.79
Gini coefficient N 0.56 0.06 0.39 0.73
Y 0.58 0.06 0.45 0.78
Note: 299 out of 550 counties in our estimation sample served as seat of the judiciary district in 1999.
All data for years 1999 or 2000.
Table V : Summary statistics of covariates
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  Table VI: Determinants of local governance
Dependent Variable:
ln(offenses/R$ audited/civil servants)
Judiciary seat -1.865 -1.241 -1.155 -0.925 -0.674 -0.399
(0.119)*** (0.132)*** (0.133)*** (0.109)*** (0.102)*** (0.103)***
Resident population -0.023 -0.022 -0.059 -0.075 -0.062
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
County electorate 0.064 0.050 -0.027
(0.018)*** (0.021)** (0.024)
Income per capita -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
(0.001)* (0.002)*** (0.004)
Average years of schooling -0.090 0.234 0.311
(0.098) (0.267) (0.261)
Urbanization -0.846 -1.227 -1.136
(0.266)*** (0.952) (0.918)
Poverty gap 0.053 -0.964 -0.332
(0.589) (3.280) (3.020)
Gini coefficient -3.398 -20.835 -17.448
(1.000)*** (9.999)** (9.147)*
(Resident population)^2 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
(County electorate)^2 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)***
(Income per capita)^2 0.000 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000)




(Poverty gap)^2 0.883 0.394
(3.258) (3.004)




(Income per capita)^3 0.000
State and Party affiliation
effects
N N Y Y Y
(0.000)
Y
Observations 547 547 547 547 547 547
R-squared 0.30 0.55 0.66 0.71 0.76 0.78
Notes: OLS regressions. RHS variables for years 1999 or 2000. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
38
Table VII: Determinants of local governance
Dependent Variable:
ln(offenses/R$ audited/civil servants)
Judiciary seat -0.396 -0.396 -0.409 -0.389 -0.399 -0.395
(0.102)*** (0.103)*** (0.102)*** (0.101)*** (0.100)*** (0.100)***
Distance from capital 0.042 0.043 0.058 0.066 0.052 0.067
(0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
Mayor's second term 0.018 0.040 0.042 0.059 0.056
(0.079) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.082)
# of political parties 0.098 0.098 0.104 0.103
(0.053)* (0.053)* (0.053)* (0.053)*
Radio station -0.152 -0.186 -0.183
(0.099) (0.099)* (0.099)*




Observations 547 547 547 547 547 547
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
Notes: OLS regressions. RHS variables for years 1999 or 2000.  Additional control variables (not
shown) include state and party affiliation effects as well as the following variables and their squares:
resident population, electorate, income per capita, average years of schooling, urbanization,
povertygap, gini coefficient. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Judiciary seat -1.28 -0.38 -0.56 -3.99 -1.91
(2.40) (0.11)*** (0.12)*** (1.55)*** (0.84)**
ln(distance from state capital) 2.85 0.05 0.07 0.54 0.22
(1.31)** (0.06) (0.07) (0.84) (0.46)
# of political parties -0.56 0.07 0.12 -0.84 -0.07
(1.05) (0.05) (0.05)** (0.67) (0.37)
Mayor's second term 2.75 0.01 0.070 2.72 -0.47
(1.88) (0.08) (0.10) (1.21)* (0.64)
Internet access 0.33 0.21 0.22 1.34 1.44
(3.15) (0.17) (0.16) (2.01) (1.11)
Radio station 2.00 -0.29 -0.11 -2.69 -1.52
(2.25) (0.11)*** (0.11) (1.44)* (0.002)**
Voter turnout 31.42 1.59 2.49 11.27 13.20
(19.10) (0.80)** (0.88)*** (12.25) (6.70)**
Observations 547 542 529 547 547
R-squared 0.75 0.74
Notes: OLS regressions for columns 2 and 3 (ln(Y)), Tobit model for columns 1, 4 and 5 (unconditional
marginal effects). Additional control variables (not shown) as in column 6 Table VI.














Judiciary seat -2.99 -4.96 -0.98 0.06 -1.19
(1.38)** (2.19)** (0.78) (0.14) (1.05)
ln(distance from state capital) 0.26 1.07 0.53 -0.07 0.09
(0.75) (1.19) (0.42) (0.08) (0.57)
# of political parties -0.59 -0.60 -0.41 0.00 0.08
(0.60) (0.95) (0.34) (0.06) (0.45)
Mayor's second term 1.04 -0.82 -0.54 -0.13 -0.25
(1.08) (1.71) (0.60) (0.10) (0.82)
Internet access 2.00 3.90 0.27 0.17 1.10
(1.80) (2.85) (1.04) (0.17) (1.37)
Radio station -1.99 -2.96 -0.44 -0.09 1.12
(1.29) (2.04) (0.72) (0.13) (0.98)
Voter turnout 15.53 18.20 10.30 0.50 9.50
(10.91) (17.38) (6.13)* (1.14) (8.23)
Observations 547 547 547 547 547
Notes: Tobit models for all columns (unconditional marginal effects). RHS variables for years 1999 or
2000. Additional control variables (not shown) as in column 6 Table VI.40
Table IX Panel A: Estimation results
                   Matching estimator                            OLS restricted to matched sample
ln(offenses/                         ATT ?1
R$ audited/ -0.368 -0.336
civil servant)   0.112    0.094
Notes: Single nearest neighbor matching with replacement. 86 treated units
that have no comparison units within a 1000 people radius are dropped from
the sample. Comparison group observations are weighted by their matching
frequency. OLS model is equation 1 in the text without state fixed effects.
Panel B: Mean differences in covariates
Variable    Treated    Comparison    t-stat.     p-value
ln(distance from             5.156 5.144 0.15 0.883
state capital)
Second term (0/1)     0.429           0.458 -0.59 0.559
Political parties (#) 2.820 2.707 1.35 0.178
Radio station (0/1) 0.594 0.467 2.64 0.009
Internet access (0/1) 0.259        0.235 0.56 0.575
Voter turnout (%) 0.845       0.834    1.70 0.090
Population (‘000)  18.999    19.013 -0.01 0.989
Electorate (‘000)  12.648 11.642   1.52 0.129
Revenue (‘000)    8081       9865 -2.25 0.025
Income per capita 156             156 -0.02 0.982
Schooling  3.874 3.805 0.54 0.588
Urbanization (%) 0.597 0.580  0.77 0.442
Poverty gap (%) 0.501 0.534 -3.70 0.000
Gin i coefficient 0.580 0.558 4.32 0.000
N                                    212
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Table X Panel A: Estimation results
                   Matching estimator                            OLS restricted to matched sample
ln(offenses/                         ATT ?1
R$ audited/ -0.350 -0.369
civil servant)   0.179   0.188
Notes: Single nearest neighbor matching with replacement. 224 treated units that have no
comparison units within a 50 people radius are dropped from the sample. Comparison group
observations are weighted by their matching frequency. OLS model is equation 1 in the text
without state fixed effects.
Panel B: Mean differences in covariates
Variable    Treated    Comparison    t-stat.     p-value
ln(distance from              5.127 5.085 0.34 0.735
state capital)
Second term (0/1) 0.405           0.418 -0.17     0.868
Political parties (#) 2.635     2.689 -0.38      0.707
Radio station (0/1) 0.459 0.337 1.51  0.133
Internet access (0/1) 0.148        0.094 1.00 0.318
Voter turnout (%)  0.855       0.845    1.04 0.301
Population (‘000)  12.681    12.678 -0.00 0.996
Electorate (‘000) 8.889     8.025   1.64 0.103
Revenue (‘000) 5995 5870   0.13 0.894
Income per capita 149         134   1.11 0.270
Schooling  3.793 3.639  0.79 0.432
Urbanization (%) 0.589 0.518 1.91  0.058
Poverty gap (%) 0.492 0.526 -2.18 0.031
Gin i coefficient 0.580 0.566   1.56  0.121
N                                        74
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